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Decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic
games: A framework for studying
informational cascades
Deepanshu Vasal and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Abstract
We study the problem of Bayesian learning in a dynamical system involving strategic agents with
asymmetric information. In a series of seminal papers in the literature, this problem has been investigated
under a simplifying model where myopically selfish players appear sequentially and act once in the game,
based on private noisy observations of the system state and public observation of past players’ actions.
It has been shown that there exist information cascades where users discard their private information
and mimic the action of their predecessor. In this paper, we provide a framework for studying Bayesian
learning dynamics in a more general setting than the one described above. In particular, our model
incorporates cases where players are non-myopic and strategically participate for the whole duration
of the game, and cases where an endogenous process selects which subset of players will act at each
time instance. The proposed framework hinges on a sequential decomposition methodology for finding
structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric
information, where user-specific states evolve as conditionally independent Markov processes and users
make independent noisy observations of their states. Using this methodology, we study a specific dynamic
learning model where players make decisions about public investment based on their estimates of
everyone’s types. We characterize a set of informational cascades for this problem where learning stops
for the team as a whole. We show that in such cascades, all players’ estimates of other players’ types
freeze even though each individual player asymptotically learns its own true type.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of how information spreads in a social network is of profound importance in under-
standing how learning occurs in a group of people or in a society, and it is important even more so
today with the ubiquitous presence of the Internet and social media. Some scenarios of interest include
how people vote for a candidate, or make a decision to buy competing products, or dynamics of mass
protests and movements, fads, trends or cult behavior. In these examples there exists a group of people
who have access to certain private information available through their peers or their own experience, and
certain publicly available information, such as actions of others, available through mass-media. Based
on this information people make decisions that affect their reward and further spread of information in
the system.
Such problems have been addressed in various disciplines such as behavioral economics, statistics,
engineering and computer science. These problems have the following key features: (a) there are multiple
decision makers (henceforth referred to as players) who can be cooperative or strategic, based on
whether they have the same or different objectives, (b) there is asymmetry of information such that
players have private and common information, and (c) there is dynamic evolution of the system. From
the mathematical perspective, analysis of such problems entails two challenges: (i) decision theoretic:
finding optimum or equilibrium or heuristic strategies of players and (ii) statistical/probabilistic/analytic:
understanding the evolution and limiting behavior of the system dynamics under those strategies.
In two seminal papers [2], [3] the authors investigated the occurrence of fads in a social network,
which was later generalized in [4]. In particular, these works study a problem of learning over a social
network with pure informational externalities (i.e., where a player’s reward does not directly depend on
other players’ actions, however, those actions provide useful information about the state of the system).
In this model, there is a product which is either good or bad and there are countably many buyers,
i.e., different decision makers, that are chosen exogenously and act exactly once in the process. Players
make a noisy observation about the value of the product and sequentially act strategically to either buy
or not buy the product. Their actions are based on their own private observation and the actions of
the previous users. It is shown that herding can occur in such a scenario, where the publicly available
information becomes powerful enough that a user discards its own private information and follows the
majority action of its predecessors. As a result, the user’s action does not reveal any new information
and all future users repeat this behavior. This phenomenon is defined as an informational cascade where
learning stops for the group as a whole. While a good cascade is desirable, there’s a positive probability
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3of a bad cascade that hurts all future users in the community. Alternative learning models that study
cascades have also appeared in the literature, such as [5], [6]. Inspired by social networks, Acemog˘olu
et al in [5] consider a model where players only observe a random set of past actions. They show that
under sufficient conditions of expanding observations and unbounded private belief log-likelihood ratios,
players learn the true state asymptotically and thus cascading does not occur. Le et al [6] study a model
where agents observe the past actions through a noisy process where again they show that cascading
does not occur. The simplifying assumption in all of these models is that players act only once in the
game and are thus myopic, which allows for easy computation of game equilibrium strategies.
There are however more general scenarios, such as cases where players participate in the game
more than once, deterministically or randomly, through an exogenous or even an endogenous process.
Furthermore, there are practical scenarios where players may be adversarial to each others’ learning
(with dynamic zero-sum games in the extreme). Studying such scenarios may reveal more interesting and
richer equilibrium behaviors including cascading phenomena not manifested in the models considered
in the current literature. An indispensable tool for studying cascades in such complex settings is a
framework for finding equilibria for these dynamical systems involving strategic players with different
information sets, which are modeled as dynamic games with asymmetric information. Appropriate
equilibrium concepts for such games include perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium,
and trembling hand equilibrium [7], [8]. Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a strategy and a
belief profile of all players where the equilibrium strategies satisfy sequential rationality (i.e., no player
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate at equilibrium) given the equilibrium beliefs and the equilibrium
beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy profile using Bayes’ rule (whenever possible). For
the games considered in the current literature including [3]–[6], since every buyer participates only for
one time period and thus acts myopically, finding PBE reduces to solving a straightforward, one-shot
optimization problem. However, for general dynamic games with asymmetric information, finding PBE
is hard, since it requires solving a fixed point equation in the space of strategy and belief profiles across
all users and all time periods (for a more elaborate discussion on the difficulty of finding PBEs, see [8,
Ch. 8]). In general, there is no known sequential decomposition methodology for finding PBE for such
games.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we consider a general model appropriate to study Bayesian learning where a finite
number of players have different states associated with them that evolve as conditionally independent
Markov processes. Players do not perfectly observe their states; rather they make independent, noisy
observations of those states. The important new ingredient in this model is that players act throughout
the game and thus are not myopic. This model extends the model considered in [9] by the same authors
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4where players observe their state perfectly. Our contributions are as follows.
(a) We first present in Theorem 1 a backward/forward algorithm for finding structured PBE (SPBE)
of the asymmetric information dynamic game. The term “structured” refers to the fact that
equilibrium strategies in SPBE depend on appropriately defined belief states instead of the whole
private history of the player. These equilibria are analogous to Markov perfect equilibria (MPE)
defined in [10], but for the case of asymmetric information. The results in [9] vis a vis Theorem 1
in this paper can be interpreted with the analogy of dynamic programming methodology for
Markov decision processes (MDP) vs that for partially observed Markov decision processes
(POMDP), where in the former, the state of the system is perfectly observed by the controller,
and in the latter the state is imperfectly observed and thus a new belief state is introduced which
then behaves as an MDP.
(b) We then utilize the aforementioned framework to study Bayesian learning dynamics and specif-
ically informational cascades in dynamic games with asymmetric information. In general, an
informational cascade at time t is the set of those public histories for which players’ actions
from that point onward stop depending on their private information. As a result, once a cascade
is entered, the system dynamics are governed only through the common information and any
private information is discarded. By focusing on structured equilibrium strategies, we propose a
concise characterization of such cascades as sets of appropriately defined public beliefs with the
above property. Unlike other settings in the cascades literature discussed before, the proposed
general framework can incorporate, as special cases, scenarios where players participate in the
game more than once, deterministically or randomly through an exogenous or endogenous process,
and scenarios where players may be adversarial to each others’ learning.
(c) Finally, we consider a specific dynamic learning model with pure informational externalities where
each player makes a decision to invest (or not invest) in the team, depending on its estimate of
the average of all players’ types. Players’ types relate to their cost for investing. In this setting,
learning players types is an important aspect of the problem, although players are not adversarial
to each others’ learning. Using the methodology presented earlier, we characterize (Theorem 2)
a set of informational cascades for this model where, once in a cascade, players’ estimates of
others’ types freeze and learning stops for the team. This occurs despite the fact that asymptotically
players learn their own types perfectly. This example serves as motivation for exploring the vast
landscape of scenarios that can be studied through the proposed methodology.
B. Relevant literature
There is a growing body of literature on learning in social networks which can broadly be categorized
as follows (1) Bayesian learning with myopic or bounded-rational selfish players, and (2) Non-Bayesian
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5learning. In the following we describe some of the representative works in each category.
1) Bayesian learning with myopic or bounded-rational players: The works in [3]–[6]
mentioned before and other related work with a similar model fall in this category where sequentially
acting selfish players participate once in the game and are thus myopic by nature. Some other works
where all players act in each period although are assumed to be myopic by design, include [11]–[15].
Mossel and Tamuz consider a repeated round of voting in [12], where in each round, a finite group of
myopically selfish players make a binary decision on worthiness of a candidate, based on their Bayesian
beliefs which are function of their private information about the candidate and previous actions of the
players. They show that a consensus is always reached and probability of a wrong decision decays
exponentially in time. Mossel et al in [13] consider general voting models and show that asymptotic
learning holds such that as the number of voters goes to infinity the probability of the correct outcome
converges to one. The same authors in [14] study how the topology of a network affects social learning
where they identify an “egalitarianism” condition under which learning occurs in large finite networks.
Harel et al. in [15] study the speed of learning with myopically selfish agents acting repeatedly and
show that only a fraction of players’ private information is transmitted through their actions, where this
fraction goes to zero as the number of players goes to infinity, demonstrating groupthink behavior. Gale
and Kariv in [16] consider a model with players on a connected social network where agents observe
their neighbors’ actions. They assume a continuum of players such that a player does not influence the
future of the game and thus acts myopically. They show that agents converge to an action in finite time,
although it may not be an optimal action. Thus there is aggregation of information but not necessarily
efficiently.
2) Non-Bayesian learning: There are works on non-Bayesian learning models where players
don’t update their beliefs in a Bayesian sense. Nedic´ et al provide a survey of such models in [17].
Some early work in this category includes the work by DeGroot in [18] where n players have different
subjective beliefs about the state of the world and in each time-period, they update their beliefs by
taking an average of everyone’s belief. The author finds sufficient conditions (based analyzing a related
Markov chain) for all players to converge to the same beliefs (i.e., the considered Markov chain has
a steady-state distribution). Jadbabaie et al consider a more general non-Bayesian model in [19], [20]
where players have imperfect recall and they consider other players’ beliefs as sufficient statistics.
Ellison and Fudenberg in [21], [22] study asymptotic learning of the true state using rule-of-thumb
policies. Bala and Goyal in [11] consider a model of myopically selfish and non-Bayesian players on
a connected social network where a player can only observe its neighbors’ actions and observations.
They show that in this model players’ beliefs converge almost surely and all players receive the same
payoff in the long run.
As mentioned before, in this paper we consider fully rational players in a truly dynamic setting.
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equilibria for such games, it is more likely that players will act with bounded-rationality or even
myopically. Although we fully appreciate this argument, we still see significant value in studying the
fully rational model, since, apart from providing a more thorough analysis, this framework does not
preclude simpler equilibrium strategies. Full rationality can be even more applicable to games involving
large institutions (e.g., firms, governments) that can employ high computational power. Moreover, this
framework allows to scale down from completely rational to bounded-rational behavior by appropriately
choosing the domain of the strategies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, we describe the model and problem statement.
In Section III we provide a general methodology to find SPBEs for such games. In Section IV, we
formally define informational cascades and specialize our methodology to study a specific Bayesian
learning game, for which we characterize a class of informational cascades. We conclude in Section V.
All proofs are relegated to several Appendices at the end of the paper.
II. GENERAL MODEL
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any variable,
subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −i to
represent all players other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N}. We use the notation
at:t′ to represent the vector (at, at+1, . . . at′) when t
′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t′ < t. We use a−it
to mean (a1t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t . . . , a
N
t ). We remove superscripts or subscripts if we want to represent
the whole vector, for example at represents (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ). In a similar vein, for any collection of finite
sets (X i)i∈N , we denote ×
N
i=1X
i by X . We denote the indicator function of any set A by IA(·).
For any finite set S, ∆(S) represents the space of probability measures on S and |S| represents its
cardinality. We denote by P g (or Eg) the probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect
to) strategy profile g. We denote the set of real numbers by R. We use the notation
∑
x f(x) to indicate
both the sum or the integral of f(x) over x i.e., we use the ‘
∑
’ sign in both cases if x were discrete
or if it were uncountable. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (βit)i∈N where probability of
action ait conditioned on (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) is given by β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t), we use the short hand notation
β−it (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x
−i
1:t) to represent
∏
j 6=i β
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, x
j
1:t). All equalities and inequalities involving
random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense.
B. Model
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system withN strategic players in the setN := {1, 2, . . .N},
over a finite time horizon T := {1, 2, . . . T } and with perfect recall. The system state is xt :=
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7(x1t , x
2
t , . . . x
N
t ), where x
i
t ∈ X
i is the state of player i at time t. Players’ states evolve as conditionally
independent, controlled Markov processes such that
P (xt|x1:t−1, a1:t−1) = P (xt|xt−1, at−1) (1a)
=
N∏
i=1
Qix(x
i
t|x
i
t−1, at−1), (1b)
where at = (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ) and a
i
t is the action taken by player i at time t. Player i does not observe
its state perfectly, rather it makes a private observation wit ∈ W
i at time t, where all observations
are conditionally independent across time and across players given xt and at−1, in the following way,
∀t ∈ {1, . . . T },
P (wt|x1:t, a1:t−1, w1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
Qiw(w
i
t|x
i
t, at−1). (2)
Player i takes action ait ∈ A
i at time t upon observing a1:t−1, which is common information among
players, and wi1:t, which is player i’s private information. The sets A
i,X i,W i are assumed to be
finite and we also assume that both the kernels Qx and Qw have full support. Let g
i = (git)t be a
probabilistic strategy of player i where git : (×
N
j=1A
j)t−1 × (W i)t → ∆(Ai) such that player i plays
action ait according to A
i
t ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t). Let g := (g
i)i∈N be a strategy profile of all players. At
the end of interval t, player i gets an instantaneous reward Ri(xt, at). The objective of player i is to
maximize its total expected reward
J i,g := Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, At)
]
. (3)
With all players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic game D with asymmetric
information and with simultaneous moves. Although this model considers all N players acting in all
periods of the game, it can accommodate cases where at each time t, players are chosen through
an endogenously defined (controlled) Markov process. This can be done by introducing a “nature”
player 0, who perfectly observes its state process (X0t )t, has reward function zero, and plays actions
a0t = w
0
t = x
0
t . Equivalently, all players publicly observe a controlled Markov process (X
0
t−1)t, and
a player selection process can be defined through this process. For instance, let X 0 = A0 = N , ∀i,
Rit(xt, at) = 0 if i 6= a
0
t , and Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at) = Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a
a0t
t ). Here, in each period only one
player acts in the game which is selected through an internal, controlled Markov process.
C. Solution concept: PBE
In this section, we introduce PBE as an appropriate equilibrium concept for the game considered.
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t, w1:t) ∈ Ht. At
any time t player i observes hit = (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t and all players together observe h
c
t = a1:t−1 ∈ H
c
t .
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8An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is the PBE [8] which consists of a pair (β∗, µ∗) of
strategy profile β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i∈N where β
∗,i
t : H
i
t → ∆(A
i) and a belief profile µ∗ = (iµ∗t )t∈T ,i∈N
where iµ∗t : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) that satisfy sequential rationality so that ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , h
i
t ∈ H
i
t, β
i
E
(β∗,iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣hit
}
≥ E(β
iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣hit
}
, (4)
and the beliefs satisfy consistency conditions as described in [8, p. 331].
In general, iµ∗t is defined as the belief of player i at time t on the history ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t, w1:t),
conditioned on its observed history hit = (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) such that
iµ∗t [h
i
t](ht) is this conditional probabil-
ity. In the following, we will define belief states ξit ∈ ∆(X
i) and piit ∈ ∆(∆(X
i)) that act as summaries
of the histories hit and h
c
t , respectively, and we will consider strategies that are defined on these belief
states.
III. A METHODOLOGY FOR CHARACTERIZING STRUCTURED PBE OF THE GAME
D
In this section, we provide a methodology to find PBE of the game D that consists of strategies
whose domain is time-invariant (while there may exist other equilibria that can not be found using
this methodology). Specifically, we seek equilibrium strategies that are structured in the sense that they
depend on players’ common and private information through belief states. In order to achieve this, at
any time t, we summarize player i’s private information, (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t), in the belief ξ
i
t ∈ ∆(X
i), and
its common information, a1:t−1, in the belief pit ∈ ∆(×i∈N∆(X i)), where ξit and pit are defined as
follows. For a strategy profile g, let ξit(x
i
t) := P
g(xit|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) be the belief of player i on its current
state conditioned on its private information. Similarly, we define pit(ξt) := P
g(ξt|a1:t−1) as common
joint belief on ξt based on the players’ common information, a1:t−1, and the corresponding marginals
piit ∈ ∆(∆(X
i)) as piit(ξ
i
t) := P
g(ξit |a1:t−1). As it will be shown later, due to the independence of
states and their evolution as independent controlled Markov processes, for any strategy profile of the
players, joint beliefs on states can be factorized as product of their marginals i.e., pit(ξt) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t).
To accentuate this independence structure, we define pit ∈ ×i∈N∆(∆(X
i)) as the vector of marginal
beliefs where pit := (pi
i
t)i∈N .
Inspired by the common agent approach in decentralized team problems [23], we now generate
players’ structured strategies as follows: player i at time t observes the common belief vector pit
and takes action γit , where γ
i
t : ∆(X
i) → ∆(Ai) is a partial (stochastic) function from its private
belief ξit such that A
i
t ∼ γ
i
t(·|ξ
i
t). These actions are generated through some policy θ
i = (θit)t∈T ,
θit : ×i∈N∆(∆(X
i)) →
{
∆(X i)→ ∆(Ai)
}
, that operates on the common belief vector pit so that
γit = θ
i
t[pit]. Then, the generated policy of the form A
i
t ∼ θ
i
t[pit](·|ξ
i
t) is also a policy of the form
Ait ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) for an appropriately defined g. Although this is not relevant to our proofs, it can
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9be shown (similar to [9, Sec. III]) that these structured policies form a sufficiently rich set of policies,
which provides a good motivation for restricting attention to such equilibria. Specifically, it can be
shown that policies g are outcome equivalent to policies θ, i.e., any expected total reward profile of the
players that can be generated through a general policy profile g can also be generated through some
policy profile θ. In the following lemma, we present update functions for the private beliefs ξit and the
public beliefs piit.
Lemma 1: There exist update functions Gi, independent of players’ strategies g, such that
ξit+1 = G
i(ξit , w
i
t+1, at) (5)
and update functions F i, independent of θ, such that
piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t , at). (6)
Thus pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at) where F is appropriately defined through (6).
Proof: The proofs are straightforward using Bayes’ rule and the fact that players’ state and
observation histories, X i1:t,W
i
1:t, are conditionally independent across players given the action history
a1:t−1. They are provided in Appendix A.
We now define an SPBE as follows.
Definition 1 (SPBE): A structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dynamic game D is a PBE
(β∗, µ∗) for which at any time t, for any agent i, its equilibrium strategy β∗,it and belief
iµ∗t depend
on player i’s information (a1:t, w
i
1:t) only through the beliefs ξ
i
t and pit.
We now present the backward/forward algorithm to find SPBE of the game D. The algorithm
resembles the one presented in [9] for perfectly observable states.
1) Backward Recursion: In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ =
(θit)i∈N ,t∈T and a sequence of value functions (V
i
t )i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where V
i
t : ×i∈N∆(∆(X
i)) ×
∆(X i)→ R, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ ×i∈N∆(∆(X
i)), i ∈ N , ξiT+1 ∈ ∆(X
i),
V iT+1(piT+1, ξ
i
T+1) := 0. (7)
2. For t = T, T−1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ ×i∈N∆(∆(X
i)), let θt[pit] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[pit],
where γ˜t is the solution, if it exists
1, of the following fixed point equation, ∀i ∈ N , ξit ∈ ∆(X
i),
γ˜it(·|ξ
i
t) ∈ arg max
γit(·|ξ
i
t)
E
γit(·|ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} , (8)
1Similar to the existence results shown in [24], it can be shown that in the special case where agent i’s instantaneous reward
does not depend on its private state xit, and for uncontrolled states and observations, the fixed point equation always has a
state-independent, myopic solution γ˜it(·), since it degenerates to a Bayesian-Nash like best-response equation.
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where expectation in (8) is with respect to random variables (Xt, At,Ξ
i
t+1) through the measure
ξt(xt)pi
−i
t (ξ
−i
t )γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t (a
−i
t |ξ
−i
t )Q
i(ξit+1|ξ
i
t , at), F is defined in Lemma 1 and Q
i is defined
in (35). Furthermore, set
V it (pit, ξ
i
t) := E
γ˜it(·|ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} . (9)
It should be noted that (8) is a fixed point equation where the maximizer γ˜it appears in both, the
left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation. However, this is not to be confused with a best
response type of a fixed-point equation as in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This distinct construction is
pivotal in the proof of Theorem 1 and its roots can be traced back to the PBE construction in [9].
2) Forward Recursion: Based on θ defined above in (7)–(9), we now construct a set of
strategies β∗ and beliefs µ∗ for the game D in a forward recursive way, as follows. As before, we
will use the notation µ∗
t
[a1:t−1] := (µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1])i∈N for the collection of marginal beliefs, and the joint
belief µ∗t [a1:t−1] can be constructed from µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1] as µ
∗
t [a1:t−1](ξt) =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
i
t), where
µ∗,it [a1:t−1] is a belief on ξ
i
t .
1. Initialize at time t = 0,
µ∗,i0 [φ](ξ0) := δQix(ξ
i
0). (10)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, i ∈ N , ∀a1:t, wi1:t
β∗,it (a
i
t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) := θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) (11a)
µ∗,it+1[a1:t] := F
i(µ∗,it [a1:t−1], θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1]], at). (11b)
We conclude the construction by noting that the required beliefs iµ∗t : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) can now be
generated directly from µ∗
t
as iµ∗t [h
i
t](ξ
−i
t ) =
∏
j 6=i µ
∗,j
t [a1:t−1](ξ
j
t ) with the understanding that under
structured strategies, a belief on ξ−it is an information state or sufficient statistic for user i to compute
its future expected reward conditioned on the history hit.
The main result of this section is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: A strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗), constructed through the backward/forward re-
cursive algorithm is a PBE of the game, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, wi1:t), β
i,
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
≥
E
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
. (12)
Proof: The proof relies on the specific fixed point construction in (7)–(9) and the conditional
independence structure of states and observations, and is provided in Appendix B.
Several remarks are in order with regard to the above methodology and the result.
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A. Remarks
Remark: When players observe their types perfectly, i.e. when W i = X i and Qiw(w
i
t|x
i
t, at−1) =
δxit(w
i
t), ∀i, w
i
t, x
i
t, at−1, then ξ
i
t(·) = δxit(·), ∀x
i
t and the results in this section reduce to the results
in [9], as expected.
Remark: In the above special case with players perfectly observing their own types, it was shown
in [9, Theorem 2] that all SPBE of the game can be found using this methodology. Using a similar
argument, it can also be shown that all SPBEs of the game considered in this paper (i.e., with noisy
types) can be found using this methodology.
Remark: The second sub-case in (37g) dictates how beliefs are updated for histories with zero
probability. The particular expression used is only one of many possible updates than can be used here.
Dynamics that govern the evolution of public beliefs at histories with zero probability of occurrence
affect equilibrium strategies. Thus, the construction proposed for calculating SPBEs in this paper will
produce a different set of equilibria if one changes the second sub-case above. The most well-known
example of another such update is the intuitive criterion proposed in [25] for Nash equilibria, later
generalized to sequential equilibria in [26]. The intuitive criterion assigns zero probability to states that
can be excluded based on data available to all players (in our case action profile history a1:t−1). Another
example of belief update is universal divinity, proposed in [27].
Remark: To highlight the significance of the unique structure of (8), one can think as follows. When
all players other than player i play structured strategies, i.e., strategies of the form Ajt ∼ θ
j
t [pit](·|ξ
j
t ),
one may want to study the optimization problem from the viewpoint of the i-th player in order to
characterize its best response. In particular one may want to show that although player i can play
general strategies of the form Ait ∼ g
i
t(·|w
i
1:t, a1:t−1), it is sufficient to best respond with structured
strategies of the form Ait ∼ θ
i
t[pit](·|ξ
i
t) as well. To show that, one may entertain the thought that player
i faces an MDP with state (Ξit,Πt), and action A
i
t at time t. If that were true, then player i’s optimal
action could be characterized (using standard MDP results) by a dynamic-programming equation similar
to (8), of the form
γ˜it(·|ξ
i
t) ∈ arg max
γit(·|ξ
i
t)
E
γit(·|ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ
i
t(·|ξ
i
t), γ˜
i
t(·|·), γ˜
−i
t , At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} ,
(13)
where, unlike (8), in the belief update equation the partial strategy γit(·|ξ
i
t) is also optimized over.
However, as it turns out, user i does not face such an MDP problem! The reason is that the update
equation pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at) also depends on γ
i
t which is the partial strategy of player i and this has
not been fixed in the above setting. If however the update equation is first fixed (so it is updated as
pit+1 = F (pit, γ˜
i
t , γ˜
−i
t , at) = F (pit, θt[pit], at), i.e., using the equilibrium strategies even for player i)
then indeed the problem faced by user i is the MDP defined above. It is now clear why (8) has the flavor
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of a fixed-point equation: the update of beliefs needs to be fixed beforehand with the equilibrium action
γ˜it even for user i, and only then user i’s best response can depend only on the MDP state (Ξ
i
t,Πt)
thus being a structured strategy as well. This implies that its optimal action γ˜it appears both on the left
and right hand side of this equation giving rise to (8).
IV. INFORMATIONAL CASCADES
In the simple herding model introduced in the seminal papers [2], [3] where selfish myopic players
sequentially acted in the game, authors introduced the notion of informational cascades as those histories
where all future players’ actions did not depend on their private information and they repeated the same
action. In this section, we define a more general notion of informational cascades as those histories of the
game where the dynamic game of asymmetric information collapses into a dynamic game of symmetric
information and the system dynamics from that point on only depend on the common information. We
define two notions of information cascades, one based on common history and other based on common
belief and in Lemma 2, we show the connection between the two definitions.
Definition 2: For a given strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) that constitutes a PBE of the game,
and for any time t and a sequence of action profiles at:T , an informational cascade is defined as the set
of public histories hct of the game such that at h
c
t and under (β
∗, µ∗), actions at:T are played almost
surely, irrespective of players’ future private history realizations. More precisely,
Cat:Tt := {h
c
t ∈ H
c
t | ∀i, ∀n ≥ t, ∀h
i
n that are consistent with
hct , and occur with non-zero probability, β
∗,i
n (a
i
n|h
i
n) = 1}. (14)
We can also specialize the definition to a constant informational cascade if action profiles in the cascade
are constant across time, i.e., for time t and action profile a, constant cascades are defined by
Cat := C
at:T
t where an = a, for n = t, . . . , T. (15)
In the above definition, we define cascades for a general model using action sets which may not
be very useful in characterizing cascades using the SPBE methodology defined before. In the following
we provide an alternative definition that due to its recursive nature is well-suited for characterizing
information cascades associated with structured strategies.
Definition 3: For a given equilibrium generating function θ, and for any time t and a sequence of
action profiles at:T , an informational cascade for the game D is defined recursively through the sets
{C˜at:Tt }t=1,...T+1 as follows. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1,
C˜T+1 :=
{
All possible common beliefs piT+1
}
(16a)
C˜at:Tt :=
{
pit | ∀i, ∀ξ
i
t ∈ supp(pi
i
t), θ
i
t[pit](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) = 1
and F (pit, θt[pit], at) ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1
}
. (16b)
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Similar to the previous definition, a constant informational cascade for time t and action profile a is
defined as
C˜at := C˜
at:T
t where an = a, for n = t, . . . , T. (17)
This backward recursive definition characterizes informational cascades as those subsets of beliefs pit that
result in players taking certain predefined actions at almost surely regardless of their private information
ξt. In addition, and because of the above, the belief updates in (37) are simplified as
piit+1(ξ
i
t+1) =
∑
ξit,x
i
t,
xit+1,w
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1), (18)
and these beliefs further result in players ignoring their private information ξit+1 in forming their future
actions. In this situation, actions control the spread of private information but they don’t reveal any new
information about xit. In other words, there is control but no signaling.
The following lemma establishes the connection between the above two definitions of cascades,
one through the action sets and other through the beliefs.
Lemma 2: Let (β∗, µ∗) be an SPBE of the gameD generated by an equilibrium generating function
θ through the backward/forward algorithm presented in Section III. Then ∀t, at:T ,
(µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) = C
at:T
t . (19)
Similarly, for a constant informational cascade, ∀t, a,
(µ∗t )
−1(C˜at ) = C
a
t . (20)
Proof: See Appendix E.
The above lemma makes precise the equivalence between the two definitions of informational
cascades (Definitions 2 and 3) which are defined on two different objects namely the space of common
histories and the space of common beliefs, respectively. The lemma connects these two definitions such
that if one finds a common history in a cascading set, then using the above lemma one can find a
corresponding common belief that is cascading, and vice versa, so long as such a belief corresponds to
some common history.
A. Example with non-adversarial learning
We now consider a specific model that captures the learning aspect in a dynamic setting with
strategic agents and decentralized information. The model is inspired by the model considered in [3],
[4] where now we consider a finite number of players who take action in every epoch and participate
during the entire duration of the game. To simplify the exposition, we assume that players’ states are
uncontrollable and static i.e., Qix(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at) = δxit(x
i
t+1), where X
i = {−1, 1} and P (X i = −1) =
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P (X i = 1) = 1/2. Since the set of states, X i has cardinality 2, the measure ξit can be sufficiently
described by ξit(1). Henceforth, in this section and in Appendix G, with slight abuse of notation, we
also denote ξit(1) by ξ
i
t ∈ [0, 1], and reference is clear from context. In each epoch t, player i makes an
independent observation wit about its state where W
i = {−1, 1}, through an observation kernel of the
form Qiw(w
i
t|x
i
t, a
i
t−1) which does not depend on a
−i
t−1. These observations are made through a binary
symmetric channel such that Qiw(−1|1, a
i) = Qiw(1| − 1, a
i) = pai , where p1 ≤ p0 < 1/2. This model
implies that taking action 1 can improve the quality of a player’s future private belief. Based on its
information, agent i takes action ait, where A
i = {0, 1}, and earns an instantaneous reward given by
Ri(x, at) = R
i(x, ait) = a
i
t
(
λxi + λ¯
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1
)
, (21)
where λ ∈ [0, 1], λ¯ = 1− λ. This scenario can be thought of as the case when players’ states represent
their talent, capabilities or popularity, and a player makes a decision to either invest (action = 1) or not
invest (action = 0) in these players, where its instantaneous reward depends on some combination of
the capabilities of all the players (including himself). We note that the instantaneous reward does not
depend on other players’ actions but on their states, and thus learning players’ states is an important
aspect of the problem.
In this case, the update functions of ξit and pi
i
t in (5), (6) reduce to
ξit+1 = G
i(ξit , w
i
t+1, a
i
t) (22a)
piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t , a
i
t). (22b)
and (8) in the backward recursion reduces to
γ˜it(·|ξ
i
t) ∈ arg max
γit(·|ξ
i
t)
γit(1|ξ
i
t)(λ(2ξ
i
t − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
t − 1))
+ Eγ
i
t(·|ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
V it+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} , (23)
where
ξˆ−it = ξˆ
−i(pi−i) :=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
E
pi
j
t [Ξjt ] =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
∫
ξjtpi
j
t (dξ
j
t ). (24)
The intuition behind this equation should be clear. The instantaneous reward of player i is proportional
to the probability of investing, γit(1|ξ
i
t), as well as the perceived talent of the entire team formed by the
combination of his perceived talent, 2ξit − 1, and his perceived talent of the rest of the team, 2ξˆ
−i
t − 1.
Furthermore, the estimate of user i on player’s j talent is the same for all players i and is a result of
their common belief pijt .
In the following theorem, we show that for the specific learning model considered in this section,
the players learn their true state asymptotically. We note that the result is true independent of the
equilibrium (since the update of ξit does not depend on strategy θ).
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Fact 1:
Ξit
a.s.
−−−→
t→∞
δxi (25)
Proof: This is a classical Bayesian learning problem and there are many techniques to prove the
above result (e.g., see [28, pages 314-316]). We provide a proof here for convenience. We prove this for
xi = 1 and similar arguments follow for xi = 0. For xi = 1, we show in Lemma 8 in Appendix F that
the process {Ξit}t is a strict sub-martingale for pai <
1
2 and ξ
i
t /∈ {0, 1}. Since it is also bounded, from
Doob’s martingale convergence theorem [29], it converges almost surely to 1 since ξi0 = Q
i
x(1) 6= 0.
Surprisingly enough, although players eventually learn their private states almost surely, the system
exhibits informational cascades. In particular, we define a time invariant set Cˆa of common beliefs pi.
This set for ai = 1 includes those public beliefs for which player i believes that the other players have
high enough types (on average) such that action ai = 1 is taken irrespective of its private belief, ξit , on
its own type, xi, and similarly for ai = 0. Let
Cˆa :=
{
pi | ∀i, λ+ λ¯(2ξˆ−i − 1) ≤ 0, if ai = 0,
−λ+ λ¯(2ξˆ−i − 1) ≥ 0, if ai = 1
}
, (26)
where ξˆ−i = ξˆ−i(pi−i) is defined in (24). The intuition behind defining this set is clear if we compare
with the instantaneous reward in (23). Regardless of how good/bad the estimate of the private state is,
the estimate of other players’ talent is so bad (good) that player i does not (does) invest.
In the following theorem we show that the set Cˆa defined in (26) characterizes a set of constant
informational cascades for this problem. Specifically, we show that Cˆa ⊂ C˜at for any t.
Theorem 2: If for some time t0 and action profile a, pit0 ∈ Cˆ
a, then ∀t ≥ t0, pit ∈ Cˆ
a and solutions
of (23) satisfy γ˜it(a
i|ξit) = 1 ∀ξ
i
t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for t0 ≤ t ≤ T , V
i
t is given by, ∀pit ∈ Cˆ
a,
V it (pit, ξ
i
t) = (T − t+ 1)(λ(2ξ
i
t − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
t − 1))a
i. (27)
Proof: See Appendix G.
Several remarks are in order regarding this result.
Remark: In addition to proving that Cˆa is a cascade, the above theorem provides an explicit
expression for the reward-to-go of each player inside this cascade. Although it is in general difficult
to solve the fixed-point equation (23), the special structure of players’ actions and the special belief
update inside a cascade makes this possible. Equation (27) implies that for those players who do not
invest, their expected reward is 0, and for those who invest, their expected reward at the time t0 they
enter the cascade is (T − t0 + 1)(λ(2ξit − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
t − 1)) ≥ (T − t0 + 1)(−λ+ λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
t − 1)) ≥ 0.
Remark: For the simplified problem considered in [3], cascades can be characterized as the fixed
points of common belief update function so that the common belief gets “stuck” once it reaches that state.
It was shown in [3] that cascades eventually occur with probability 1 for that model. For the learning
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model considered here, common beliefs pit still evolve in a cascade governed by the uninformative,
non-signaling update of the common belief pit by F (pit, ·, at), i.e., their evolution is directed by the
primitives of the process and not on the new random variables being generated namely players’ private
observations.
Remark: Conceptually, informational cascades can be thought of as absorbing states of the system.
Indeed, given an equilibrium strategy profile, the common belief (Πt)t≥1 is a Markov chain. It is thus
natural to ask questions regarding the dynamics of the process that could lead to those states, for
example hitting times of such sets and absorption probabilities. We remark that this is a rather difficult
task since it involves finding the equilibrium strategies, i.e., solving the fixed-point eqaution (23) for all
values of pit and not only for those values of pit inside the cascade as done in Theorem 2. One trivial
case when cascades could occur for this model is if the system was born in a cascade, i.e., the initial
common belief, based on the prior distributions, is pi1 ∈ Cˆa. More generally, a cascade could occur as
in the following case. Suppose all players have low states (i.e., xi = −1 for all i ∈ N ), but they get
atypical observations initially, which lead them into believing that their states are high (xi = 1). This
information is conveyed through their actions, which leads the public belief into a cascade. Now, even
though the players eventually learn their true states, yet they remain in a (bad) cascade, each player
believing that others have high states on average.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we study Bayesian learning dynamics of a specific class of dynamic games with
asymmetric information. In the literature, a simplifying model is considered where herding behavior
by selfish players is shown in a sequential buyers’ game where a countable number of strategic buyers
buy a product exactly once in the game. In this paper, we consider a more general scenario where
players could participate in the game throughout the duration of the game. Players’ states evolve as
conditionally independent controlled Markov processes and players made noisy observations of their
states. We first present a sequential decomposition methodology to find SPBE of the game. We then
study a specific learning model and characterize information cascades using the general methodology
described before. In general, the methodology presented serves as a framework for studying learning
dynamics of decentralized systems with strategic agents. Some important research directions include
characterization of cascades for specific classes of models, studying convergent learning behavior in such
games including the probability and the rate of “falling” into a cascade, and incentive or mechanism
design to avoid bad cascades.
APPENDIX A
Proof: We first prove the following lemma on conditional independence of x1:t, w1:t given a1:t−1.
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Lemma 3: For any policy profile g and ∀t,
P g(x1:t, w1:t|a1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t, w
i
1:t|a1:t−1) (28)
Proof:
P g(x1:t, w1:t|a1:t−1)
=
P g(x1:t, w1:t, a1:t−1)∑
x1:t,w1:t
P g(x1:t, w1:t, a1:t−1)
(29a)
=
∏N
i=1Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, w
i
1:n−1)Q
i
x(x
i
n+1|an, x
i
n)Q
i
w(w
i
n+1|x
i
n+1, an)∑
x1:t,w1:t
∏N
i=1Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, w
i
1:n−1)Q
i
x(x
i
n+1|an, x
i
n)Q
i
w(w
i
n+1|x
i
n+1, an)
(29b)
=
∏N
i=1Q
i
x(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, w
i
1:n−1)Q
i
x(x
i
n+1|an, x
i
n)Q
i
w(w
i
n+1|x
i
n+1, an)∏N
i=1
∑
xi1:t,w
i
1:t
Qix(x
i
1)Q
i
w(w
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t−1
n=1 g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, w
i
1:n−1)Q
i
x(x
i
n+1|an, x
i
n)Q
i
w(w
i
n+1|x
i
n+1, an)
(29c)
and thus
P g(x1:t, w1:t|a1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t, w
i
1:t|a1:t−1) (29d)
Now for any g we have,
ξit+1(x
i
t+1)
△
= P g(xit+1|a1:t, w
i
1:t+1) (30a)
=
∑
xit
P g(xit, at, x
i
t+1, w
i
t+1|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)∑
x˜i
t+1
x˜it
P g(x˜it, at, w
i
t+1, x˜
i
t+1|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)
(30b)
=
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)P
g(a−it |a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|at, x
i
t)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)∑
x˜it+1
x˜it
ξit(x˜
i
t)P
g(a−it |a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x˜
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|at, x˜
i
t)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x˜
i
t+1, at)
, (30c)
where (30c) is true because ait is a function of (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) and thus the term involving a
i
t can be
cancelled in numerator and denominator. We now consider the quantity P g(a−it |a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x
i
t)
P g(a−it |a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x
i
t) =
∑
w
−i
1:t
P g(a−it , w
−i
1:t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x
i
t) (31a)
=
∑
w
−i
1:t
P g(w−i1:t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t, x
i
t)
∏
j 6=i
gjt (a
j
t |a1:t−1, w
j
1:t) (31b)
=
∑
w
−i
1:t
P g
−i
(w−i1:t|a1:t−1)
∏
j 6=i
gjt (a
j
t |a1:t−1, w
j
1:t) (31c)
= P g
−i
(a−it |a1:t−1) (31d)
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where (31c) follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix A since w−i1:t is conditionally independent of (w
i
1:t, x
i
t)
given a1:t−1 and is only a function of g
−i. Since this term does not depend on xit, it gets cancelled in
the final expression of ξit+1
ξit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)∑
x˜i
t+1
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x˜
i
t+1, at)
. (32)
Thus the claim of the lemma follows. Based on this claim, we can conclude that
ξit(x
i
t) = P
g(xit|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) = P (x
i
t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t). (33)
Also, based on the update of ξit in (5), we define an update kernel
Qi(ξit+1|ξ
i
t , at) := P (ξ
i
t+1|ξ
i
t , at) (34)
=
∑
xit,x
i
t+1
,wi
t+1
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,ait)(ξ
i
t+1) (35)
Lemma 4: There exists an update function F i of piit, independent of ψ
piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t , at) (36)
Proof:
pit+1(ξt+1)
= Pψ(ξt+1|a1:t, γ1:t+1) (37a)
= Pψ(ξt+1|a1:t, γ1:t) (37b)
=
∑
ξt,xt,
xt+1,wt+1
Pψ(ξt, xt, at, xt+1, wt+1, ξt+1|a1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
ξt
Pψ(ξt, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t)
(37c)
=
∑
ξt,xt,
xt+1,wt+1
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1)∑
ξt
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)
(37d)
=
∏N
i=1
∑
ξit,x
i
t,
xit+1,w
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1)
∑
ξt
∏N
i=1 pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)
(37e)
=
∏N
i=1
∑
ξit,x
i
t,
xit+1,w
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1)
∏N
i=1
∑
ξit
piit(ξ
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)
(37f)
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When the denominator in the above equation is 0, we define
pit+1(ξt+1) =
N∏
i=1
∑
ξit,x
i
t,
xit+1,w
i
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(ξ
i
t+1) (37g)
Thus we have,
pit+1 =
N∏
i=1
F i(piit , γ
i
t , at) (37h)
APPENDIX B
(PROOF OF THEOREM 1)
Proof: We prove (12) using induction and from results in Lemma 5, 6 and 7 proved in Appendix C.
For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (a1:T−1, wi1:T ) ∈ H
i
T , β
i
E
β
∗,i
T
β
∗,−i
T
, µ∗T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T}
= V iT (µ
∗
T
[a1:T−1], ξ
i
T ) (38a)
≥ Eβ
i
T β
∗,−i
T
, µ∗T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T} (38b)
where (38a) follows from Lemma 7 and (38b) follows from Lemma 5 in Appendix C.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ H
i
t+1, β
i,
E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
≥
E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (39a)
Then ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, wi1:t) ∈ H
i
t, β
i, we have
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξ
i
t) (40a)
≥ Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (40b)
= Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:tW it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(40c)
≥ Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
µ∗t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(40d)
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= Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)
+Eβ
i
t:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(40e)
= Eβ
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
, (40f)
where (40a) follows from Lemma 7, (40b) follows from Lemma 5, (40c) follows from Lemma 7, (40d)
follows from induction hypothesis in (39a) and (40e) follows from Lemma 6. Moreover, construction
of θ in (8), and consequently definition of β∗ in (11a) are pivotal for (40e) to follow from (40d).
We note that µ∗ satisfies the consistency condition of [8, p. 331] from the fact that (a) for all t and
for every common history a1:t−1, all players use the same belief µ
∗
t [a1:t−1] on xt and (b) the belief
µ∗t can be factorized as µ
∗
t [a1:t−1] =
∏N
i=1 µ
∗,i
t [a1:t−1] ∀a1:t−1 ∈ H
c
t where µ
∗,i
t is updated through
Bayes’ rule (F ) as in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
APPENDIX C
Lemma 5: ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t, β
i
t
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξ
i
t) ≥E
βitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+ (41)
V it+1(F (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|a1:t−1, ·), At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} . (42)
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, βˆit, aˆ1:t−1, wˆ
i
1:t such that
E
βˆitβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t}
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆ
i
t). (43)
We will show that this contradicts the definition of V it in (9).
Construct γˆit(a
i
t|ξ
i
t) =


βˆit(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, wˆ
i
1:t) ξ
i
t = ξˆ
i
t
arbitrary otherwise.
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Then for aˆ1:t−1, wˆ
i
1:t, we have
V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆ
i
t)
= max
γit(·|ξˆ
i
t)
E
γit(·|ξˆ
i
t)β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξˆit} ,
(44a)
≥ Eγˆ
i
t(·|ξˆ
i
t)β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξˆit} (44b)
=
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t ,at,ξt+1
{
Ri(xt, at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), ξ
i
t+1)
}
×
ξˆit(x
i
t)ξ
−i
t (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [aˆ1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )γˆ
i
t(a
i
t|ξˆ
i
t)β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |aˆ1:t−1, ξ
−i
t )Q
i(ξit+1|ξˆ
i
t , at) (44c)
=
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t ,
at,ξt+1
{
Ri(xt, at) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), ξ
i
t+1)
}
×
ξˆit(x
i
t)ξ
−i
t (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [aˆ1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )βˆ
i
t(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, wˆ
i
1:t)β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |aˆ1:t−1, ξ
−i
t )Q
i(ξit+1|ξˆ
i
t, at) (44d)
= Eβˆ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t ,µ
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], β
∗
t (·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣aˆ1:t−1, wˆi1:t}
(44e)
> V it (µ
∗
t
[aˆ1:t−1], ξˆ
i
t) (44f)
where (44a) follows from the definition of V it in (9), (44d) follows from definition of γˆ
i
t and (44f)
follows from (43). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 6: ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ H
i
t+1 and β
i
t
E
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
=
E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (45)
Thus the above quantities do not depend on βit .
Proof: Essentially this claim stands on the fact that µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t] can be updated from µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t
and at, as µ
∗,−i
t+1 [a1:t] =
∏
j 6=i F
−i(µ∗,−it [a1:t−1], β
∗,−i
t , at) as in Lemma 1. Since the above expectations
involve random variablesXt+1:T , At+1:T ,, we consider P
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](xt+1:T , at+1:T
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1).
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](xt+1:T , at+1:T
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1) =
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](at, xt+1, w
i
t+1
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)
P β
i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](at, wit+1
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t) P
βit:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t, xt+1)
(46a)
April 10, 2018 DRAFT
22
We note that
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](at+1:T , xt+2:T
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t, xt+1)
= βit+1(a
i
t+1
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)β−it+1(a−it+1∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)ξit+1(xit+1)∑
ξ
−i
t+1
µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t](ξ
−i
t+1)ξ
−i
t+1(x
−i
t+1)
P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t](at+2:T , xt+3:T
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t, xt+3) (46b)
= P β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, w
i
1:t, xt+1) (46c)
We consider the numerator and the denominator on the left hand side of the above equation separately.
The numerator in (46a) is given by
Nr =
∑
xt,ξ
−i
t
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1](xt, ξ
−i
t
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t)βit(ait|a1:t−1, wi1:t)β∗,−it (a−it |a1:t−1, ξ−it )Qx(xt+1|xt, at)
Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at) (46d)
=

∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|xt, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)



 ∑
x
−i
t ,ξ
−i
t
ξ−it (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ
−i
t )Q
−i
x (x
−i
t+1|xt, at)


(46e)
where (46e) follows from the fact that probability on (at+1:T , x2+t:T ) given a1:t, w
i
1:t+1, xt:t+1, µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
depends on a1:t, w
i
1:t+1, xt+1, µ
∗
t+1[a1:t] through β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T . Similarly, the denominator in (46a) is
given by
Dr =
∑
x˜t,ξ˜
−i
t ,x˜
i
t+1
P β
i
t:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t (x˜t, ξ
−i
t |a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ˜
−i
t )Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|x˜
i
t, at)
Qiw(w
i
t+1|x˜
i
t+1, at) (46f)
=

 ∑
x˜it,x˜
i
t+1
ξit(x˜
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|x˜
i
t, at)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x˜
i
t+1, at)


∑
x˜t,ξ˜
−i
t ,x˜
i
t+1
ξ˜−it (x˜
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ˜
−i
t )β
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, w
i
1:t)β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ˜
−i
t )
(46g)
By canceling the terms βit(·) in the numerator and the denominator, and using the update equation
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for ξit , (46a) is given by
Nr =
∑
xit
ξit(x
i
t)Q
i
x(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a
i
t)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i
t+1, at)
∑
x
−i
t ,ξ
−i
t
ξ−it (x
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ
−i
t )Q
−i
x (x
−i
t+1|x
−i
t , at) (46h)
and
Dr =
∑
x˜it,x˜
i
t+1
ξit(x˜
i
t)Q
i
x(x˜
i
t+1|x˜
i
t, at)Qw(w
i
t+1|x˜
i
t+1, at)
∑
x˜
−i
t ,ξ˜
−i
t
ξ˜−it (x˜
−i
t )µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](ξ˜
−i
t )β
∗,−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, ξ˜
−i
t )
(46i)
Thus (46a) is given by
= ξit+1(x
i
t+1)
∑
ξ
−i
t+1
µ∗,−it+1 [a1:t](ξ
−i
t+1)ξ
−i
t+1(x
−i
t+1)P
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, w
i
1:t, xt+1)
(46j)
= P β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t](xt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, w
i
1:t+1). (46k)
Lemma 7: ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , a1:t−1 ∈ Hct , w
i
1:t ∈ (W
i)t
V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξ
i
t) = E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
,µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
. (47)
Proof:
We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
β
∗,i
T
β
∗,−i
T
, µ∗T [a1:T−1]
{
Ri(XT , AT )
∣∣∣a1:T−1, wi1:T}
=
∑
x
−i
T
aT
Ri(xT , aT )ξT (xT )µ
∗
T [a1:T−1](ξ
−i
T )β
∗,i
T (a
i
T |a1:T−1, ξ
i
T )β
∗,−i
T (a
−i
T |a1:T−1, ξ
−i
T ) (48a)
= V iT (µ
∗
T
[a1:T−1], ξ
i
T ), (48b)
where (48b) follows from the definition of V it in (9) and the definition of β
∗
T in the forward recursion
in (11a).
Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, wi1:t+1) ∈ H
i
t+1
V it+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t], ξ
i
t+1) = E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t, wi1:t+1
}
. (49)
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Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, w
i
1:t) ∈ H
i
t, we have
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(50a)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At)+
E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Ri(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(50b)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (50c)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(µ
∗
t+1
[a1:t−1At],Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t} (50d)
= V it (µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξ
i
t), (50e)
where (50b) follows from Lemma 6 in Appendix C, (50c) follows from the induction hypothesis in
(49), (50d) follows because the random variables involved in expectation, X−it , At, X
i
t+1 do not depend
on β∗,it+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T and (50e) follows from the definition of β
∗
t in the forward recursion in (11a), the
definition of µ∗t+1 in (11b) and the definition of V
i
t in (9).
APPENDIX D
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. Suppose for any equilibrium generating function φ that
generates (β∗, µ∗) through forward recursion, there exists t ∈ T , i ∈ N , a1:t−1 ∈ Hct , such that for
pit = µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], (8) is not satisfied for φ i.e. for γ˜
i
t = φ
i[pit] = β
∗,i
t (·|µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ξ
i
t),
γ˜it 6∈ argmax
γit
E
γit(·|x
i)γ˜−it , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At)
+V it+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} . (51)
Let t be the first instance in the backward recursion when this happens. This implies ∃ γˆit such that
E
γˆit(·|x
i)γ˜−it , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit}
> Eγ˜
i
t(·|x
i)γ˜−it , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} (52)
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This implies for βˆt(·|µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1], ·) = γˆ
i
t ,
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Rit(Xt, At) + E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(53)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Rit(Xt, At) + E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, µ∗t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(54)
= Eγ˜
i
t(·|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At) + V
i
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} (55)
< Eβˆ
i
t(·|µ
∗
t
[a1:t−1],ξ
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , pit
{
Rit(Xt, At)
+V it+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At),Ξ
i
t+1)
∣∣∣ξit} (56)
= Eβˆ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , µ
∗
t [a1:t−1]
{
Rit(Xt, At) + E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
µ∗t+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, wi1:t,W it+1
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
(57)
= Eβˆ
i
t ,β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, wi1:t
}
, (58)
where (54) follows from Lemma 6, (55) follows from the definitions of γ˜it and µ
∗
t+1[a1:t−1, At] and
Lemma 7, (56) follows from (52) and the definition of βˆit , (57) follows from Lemma 5, (58) follows
from Lemma 6. However, this leads to a contradiction since (β∗, µ∗) is a PBE of the game.
APPENDIX E
Proof: We will prove the result by induction on t. The result is vacuously true for T +1. Suppose
it is also true for t+ 1, i.e.
(µ∗t+1)
−1(C˜
at+1:T
t+1 ) = C
at+1:T
t+1 . (59)
We show that the result holds true for t. In the following two cases, we show that if there exists an
element in one set, it also belongs to the other. From the contrapositive of the statement, if one is empty,
so is the other.
Case 1. We prove (µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) ⊂ C
at:T
t
Let hct ∈ (µ
∗
t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ). We will show that h
c
t ∈ C
at:T
t .
Since hct ∈ (µ
∗
t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ), this implies µ
∗
t [h
c
t ] ∈ C˜
at:T
t . Then by the definition of C˜
at:T
t , ∀i, ∀ξ
i
t ∈
supp(µ∗,it [h
c
t ]), θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[hct ]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) = 1. Since ξ
i
t(x
i
t) = P (x
i
t|h
i
t) ∀x
i
t, µ
∗,i
t [h
c
t ](ξ
i
t) = P
θ(ξit |h
c
t) ∀ξ
i
t and
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β∗,it (a
i
t|h
i
t) = θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[hct ]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) by the definition of β
∗, this implies ∀i, β∗,it (a
i
t|h
i
t) = 1, ∀h
i
t that are
consistent with hct and occur with non-zero probability.
Also since µ∗t [h
c
t ] ∈ C˜
at:T
t , this implies F (µ
∗
t
[hct ], θt[µ
∗
t
[hct ]], at) ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1 by definition of C˜
at:T
t .
Thus µ∗t+1[h
c
t , at] ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1 , since µ
∗
t+1[h
c
t , at] = F (µ
∗
t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t
[hct ]], at) by definition. Using the
induction hypothesis, (hct , at) ∈ C
at+1:T
t+1 , which implies ∀i, β
∗,i
n (a
i
n|h
i
n) = 1, ∀n ≥ t+ 1, ∀h
i
n that are
consistent with (hct , at) and occur with non-zero probability.
The above two facts conclude that ∀i, β∗,in (a
i
n|h
i
n) = 1, ∀n ≥ t, ∀h
i
n that are consistent with h
c
t
and occur with non-zero probability, which implies hct ∈ C
at:T
t by the definition of C
at:T
t .
Case 2. We prove (µ∗t )
−1(C˜at:Tt ) ⊃ C
at:T
t .
Let hct ∈ C
at:T
t . We will show that µ
∗
t [h
c
t ] ∈ C˜
at:T
t .
Since hct ∈ C
at:T
t , this implies ∀i, β
∗,i
t (a
i
t|h
i
t) = 1, ∀h
i
t that are consistent with h
c
t and occur with
non-zero probability. Since β∗,it (a
i
t|h
i
t) = θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[hct ]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t), by the definition of β
∗, where ξit(x
i
t) =
P (xit|h
i
t) ∀x
i
t, this implies ∀i, θ
i
t[µ
∗
t
[hct ]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) = 1, ∀ξ
i
t ∈ supp(µ
∗,i
t [h
c
t ]), where µ
∗,i
t [h
c
t ](ξ
i
t) = P
θ(ξit |h
c
t) ∀ξ
i
t .
Also, since hct ∈ C
at:T
t , it is implied by the definition of C
at:T
t that (h
c
t , at) ∈ C
at+1:T
t+1 . This implies
µ∗t+1[h
c
t , at] ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1 by the induction hypothesis. Since, by definition, µ
∗
t+1[h
c
t , at] = F ([µ
∗
t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t
[hct ]], at),
this implies F (µ∗t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t
[hct ]], at) ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1 .
Since we have shown that ∀i, θit[µ
∗
t
[hct ]](a
i
t|ξ
i
t) = 1, ∀ξ
i
t ∈ supp(µ
∗
t [h
c
t ]) and
F (µ∗t [h
c
t ], θt[µ
∗
t
[hct ]], at) ∈ C˜
at+1:T
t+1 , this implies µ
∗
t [h
c
t ] ∈ C˜
at:T
t by the definition of C˜
at:T
t .
The above two cases complete the induction step.
APPENDIX F
Lemma 8: Conditioned on xi = 1, {Ξit}t is a sub-martingale.
Proof:
ξit+1 =


Gi(ξit , w
i
t+1 = 0, a
i
t) =
ξitpait
ξitpait + (1− ξ
i
t)(1 − pait)
with probability pait
Gi(ξit , w
i
t+1 = 1, a
i
t) =
ξit(1 − pait)
ξit(1− pait) + (1− ξ
i
t)pait
with probability 1− pait
(60)
Thus,
E[ξit+1|ξ
i
t , a
i
t]− ξ
i
t =
ξit(pait)
2
ξitpait + (1− ξ
i
t)(1 − pait)
+
ξit(1 − pait)
2
ξit(1− pait) + (1 − ξ
i
t)pait
− ξit (61)
=
ξit(1− ξ
i
t)
2(1 − 2pait)
2
(ξitpait + (1− ξ
i
t)(1− pait))(ξ
i
t(1 − pait) + (1− ξ
i
t)pait)
(62)
≥ 0 (63)
with the inequality being strict for pait <
1
2 and ξ
i
t /∈ {0, 1}.
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APPENDIX G
Proof: We prove this by induction on t0. For t0 = T , (23) reduces to
γ˜iT (·|ξ
i
T ) ∈ arg max
γi
T
(·|ξi
T
)
∑
ai
T
aiTγ
i
T (a
i
T |ξ
i
T )(λ(2ξ
i
T − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
T − 1)), (64)
and since piT ∈ Cˆa, it is easy to verify that γ˜iT (a
i|ξiT ) = 1, ∀ξ
i
T ∈ [0, 1] and thus V
i
T (piT , ξ
i
T ) =
(λ(2ξiT − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
T − 1))a
i. This establishes the base case.
Now, suppose the claim is true for t0 = τ + 1 i.e. if piτ+1 ∈ Cˆa, then ∀t ≥ τ + 1, pit ∈ Cˆa and
γ˜it(a
i|ξit) = 1 ∀ξ
i
t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for τ + 1 ≤ t ≤ T , V
i
t is given by, ∀pit ∈ Cˆ
a,
V it (pit, ξ
i
t) = (T − t+ 1)(λ(2ξ
i
t − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
t − 1))a
i. (65)
Then if piτ ∈ Cˆa, then γ˜iτ (a
i|ξiτ ) = 1 ∀ξ
i
τ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies (23) since,
γ˜iτ (·|ξ
i
τ ) ∈ arg max
γiτ (·|ξ
i
τ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξ
i
τ )(λ(2ξ
i
τ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1))
+ Eγ
i
τ (·|ξ
i
τ)γ˜
−i
τ , piτ
{
V iτ+1(F (piτ , γ˜τ , Aτ ),Ξ
i
τ+1)
∣∣∣ξiτ} (66a)
= arg max
γiτ (·|ξ
i
τ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξ
i
τ )(λ(2ξ
i
τ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1))
+ Eγ
i
τ (·|ξ
i
τ )γ˜
−i
τ , piτ
{
(T − τ)(λ(2Ξiτ+1 − 1) + λ¯(2Ξˆ
−i
τ+1 − 1))a
i|ξiτ
}
(67a)
= arg max
γiτ (·|ξ
i
τ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξ
i
τ )(λ(2ξ
i
τ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1))
+ (T − τ)(λ(2ξiτ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1))a
i (67b)
= arg max
γiτ (·|ξ
i
τ )
∑
aiτ
aiτγ
i
τ (a
i
τ |ξ
i
τ )(λ(2ξ
i
τ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1)), (67c)
where (67a) follows from the fact that F (piτ , γ˜τ , aτ ) ∈ C
a, ∀aτ , as shown in Lemma 9, and induction
hypothesis, (67b) follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 and (67c) follows from the fact that the second
term does not depend on γiτ (·|ξ
i
τ ). This also shows that, ∀pit ∈ Cˆ
a,
V iτ (piτ , ξ
i
τ ) = (T − τ + 1)(λ(2ξ
i
τ − 1) + λ¯(2ξˆ
−i
τ − 1))a
i, (68)
which completes the induction step.
Lemma 9: Expectation of piit+1 under non-informative γ˜
i
t of the form γ˜
i
t(a
i|ξit) = 1 ∀ξ
i
t ∈ [0, 1],
remains the same as mean of piit, i.e.,
E{Ξit+1(1)|pi
i
t, γ˜
i
t , a
i} = E{Ξit(1)|pi
i
t} (69)
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Proof:
E{Ξit+1(1)|pi
i
t, γ˜
i
t , a
i}
=
∑
ξi
t+1
(1)
ξit+1(1)F
i(piit, γ˜
i
t , a
i)(ξit+1(1)) (70a)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,ξi
t+1
(1) ξ
i
t+1(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)γ˜it(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|x
i, at)IGi(ξit,wit+1,at)(1)(ξ
i
t+1(1))∑
ξit,x
i,wi
t+1
piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)γ˜it(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)
(70b)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,wi
t+1
,ξi
t+1
(1) ξ
i
t+1(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ai)IGi(ξit,wit+1,ai)(1)(ξ
i
t+1(1))∑
ξit,x
i piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)
(70c)
=
∑
ξit,x
i,wi
t+1
Gi(ξit , w
i
t+1, a
i)(1)piit(ξ
i
t)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ai) (70d)
=
∑
ξit,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, a
i)∑
x˜i ξ
i
t(x˜
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x˜
i, ai)
piit(ξ
i
t)
∑
xi
ξit(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ai) (70e)
=
∑
ξit
ξit(1)pi
i
t(ξ
i
t(1)) (70f)
= E{Ξit(1)|pi
i
t} (70g)
Lemma 10: For any γit ,
E{Ξit+1(1)|ξ
i
t , γ
i
t} = ξ
i
t(1) (71)
Proof:
E{Ξit+1(1)|ξ
i
t , γ
i
t}
=
∑
xi,wi
t+1
,ait,ξ
i
t+1
(1)
ξit+1(1)IF i(ξit,wit+1,ait)(1)(ξ
i
t+1(1))ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ait)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t) (72a)
=
∑
xi,wi
t+1
,ait
F i(ξit , w
i
t+1, a
i
t)(1)ξ
i
t(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ait)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t) (72b)
=
∑
ait,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, a
i
t)∑
x˜i ξ
i
t(x˜
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x˜
i, ait)
γit(a
i
t|ξ
i
t)
∑
xi
ξit(x
i)Qiw(w
i
t+1|x
i, ait) (72c)
=
∑
ait,w
i
t+1
ξit(1)Q
i
w(w
i
t+1|1, a
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|ξ
i
t) (72d)
= ξit(1) (72e)
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